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AN ASPECT OF TRAGEDY *
TONIGHT I WISH to put before you a few, still tentative ideas about 
the origin and nature of that “ pity and terror’ ’ which most critics since 
Aristotle have regarded as essential to Tragedy.
Let me start with an attempted definition:
The pity and terror proper to tragedy are communicated by 
witnessing a protracted spiritual crisis involving the disintegration (or 
tearing asunder) of a personality (or self). This is accompanied by 
a revelation of the reality of evil.
I shall attempt to substantiate this definition in the following 
manner.
I. A very brief and possibly redundant argument to establish 
the interior nature of tragedy, by contrasting it with melodrama.
II.  B y examining their origins, I shall try to show (a) how both 
liturgical drama and tragedy, like the rituals from which they spring, 
are both concerned with the problem of evil, and (b) how they differ 
in their treatment of it.
III. I shall define what I mean by “ personality or self’ ’ ; then, by 
comparing a tragic hero’s experience with that of a non-tragic sufferer, 
attempt to show that the difference consists in a “ protracted spiritual 
crisis involving a tearing asunder of the self” . This will be illustrated 
by a comparison of the heroes of a liturgical play, Everyman, and a 
tragedy, The Oresteia.
IV.   I shall read central passages from plays, ancient and modem, 
which contain “ a revelation of the reality of evil” .
*) Also published in “ Standpunte” , 27 April, 1953.
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V. I shall end with a brief glance at various dramatic answers to 
this revelation of evil.
I
First, then, the interior nature of tragedy.
This seems to me to be one of the points on which Aristotle, 
usually so precise, has not been precise enough.
“ Terror and pity may be raised by the decoration, . . . the mere 
spectacle: but they may also arise from the circumstances of the 
action itself: which is far preferable and shows the superior poet. 
For the fable (or plot) should be so constructed that without the 
assistance of sight, it’s incidents may excite terror and commiseration 
in those who hear them only.”
Poetics, Part II, X III, translated T . Twining.
Everym an No. 907, p. 14.
Yet if terror and pity may be raised by the mere spectacle, a 
melodrama might qualify for the august title of tragedy. He admits, 
however, that the ear is more important than the eye. If he had 
carried this further, he might have specified the proper means for 
producing tragic pity and terror. Obviously it depends on the spoken 
word; and, as it is through the spoken word more than by any other 
means that we get to know the thoughts and feelings of people, we 
may take it that the type of pity and terror aroused by tragedy springs, 
in part at least, from internal, psychological disaster: not what is 
happening in the palace at Elsinore, which can be communicated in 
a thrilling dumb-show, but what is happening in the soul of Hamlet, 
which calls for words. It is this interior aspect of tragedy which 
distinguishes it from melodrama, which raises pity and terror by 
external means, and lacks any psychological depth.
II
Similarities and differences between ritual, liturgical drama and 
tragedy, particularly in regard to the problem of evil.
Like many other arts, both Greek and Modem drama grew out of 
rituals which were concerned with the ultimate mysteries of Life and 
Death. These two words, in all societies, become loaded with a variety 
of meanings. Life suggests not only what supports life, —  light, food,
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warmth, shelter, —  but what makes life worth living: affection, joy, 
sanity, beauty, order. And Death suggests not only his crude 
henchmen, —  darkness, hunger, cold, exile,— but also hatred, boredom, 
strife, madness, chaos.
It is generally accepted that the rites from which Greek Drama 
grew were those of the god Dionysus. The pattern of his life, death 
and resurrection contained the following main episodes: his agon, or 
conflict with his enemy: his pathos, or suffering, downfall and defeat: 
then what might be called the triumph or revelation of Evil, (Death), 
his death and sparagmos, the tearing to pieces and scattering of his 
dismembered body: finally his resurrection and reintegration, his 
anargorisis or recognition, which might be described as the second 
revelation, the triumph of Good, (Life).
Originally Dionysus is a vegetation god, the epitome of the seed 
that must die in order to live, and give life. Upon his seasonal death 
and resurrection, the crops, and hence the lives of his worshippers 
depend. Anthropologists give a most satisfying account of what 
agricultural processes are represented by the stages of ritual. It seems 
more than likely however, that from their inception, the stages through 
which the god passed in the annual rites, corresponded to certain 
movements of the individual psyche: that the agon and pathos stood 
not only for the struggle and suffering of animal and vegetable life 
in the face of winter cold or summer drought, nor the sparagmos, death 
and anagnoriris for the scattering of the seed, its death, and rebirth in 
the new crop, but for the interior process of dying to the old self and 
being reborn, a new creature. The rite is Janus-headed: it does service 
both for the external and the internal worlds.
The rite from which Medieval Drama, and hence our own, springs, 
is at once remarkably similar and radically different. The differences 
do not concern us here except to remark that the Mass, from the 
evening of its inception, was concerned with the destiny of the soul, 
not with the annual vicissitudes of the crops.
If we equate the Crucification with the sparagmos, the parallel 
between the patterns is complete: both contain a double revelation: a 
temporary victory of the powers of Evil (death, darkness and chaos), 
followed by a victory of the powers of Good (life, light and order). In 
the northern hemisphere, of course, Easter is timed to coincide with 
spring, so that the rebirth of nature provides a telling symbol for the 
new life in the soul.
The first Medieval plays were dramatisations of the ritual for 
Good Friday and Easter Monday, and were aimed at deepening the
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worshipper’s penitence and mortification, and his joy: to help him 
die to himself, that he might be reborn. The later dramatisations 
of the whole Bible were wider in scope: they portrayed the same 
pattern as it affected the whole race, not the individual: the fall of 
Man, his long agon and pathos in the Old Testament, his death and 
resurrection in the New.
Both ritual and liturgical drama, then, have an answer to the 
problem of evil. The believer, no matter how he suffers, is saved 
from a crucifixion or dismemberment of his soul, first, by his 
acceptance by faith of his God’s victory over sin and hell and death, 
a victory which is his, if he submits to a moral discipline,— a denial 
of self, an abnegation of that pride which is the acknowledged tragic 
sin. A saint may suffer torments of doubt and physical torture, but 
provided he maintains his faith in ultimate victory, he is never tragic. 
The tragic hero, however, lacks or loses this assurance, or having it, 
refuses to submit to the moral discipline. He finds he cannot cope 
with evil on his own. His soul is torn to pieces. In his agony, he may 
or may not discover an answer.
Let us glance at the development of tragedy out of liturgical drama.
Tragedy proper comes in both Greece and modern Europe with 
the rise of nationalism, the secular spirit, and individualism. The 
stage reflects the spirit of the age. The god, or demi-god of the Greek 
ritual, or the patriarch, martyr or the saint of the Miracle play, is 
replaced by a figure symbolic of the new values: in the case of Greece, 
a hero of the Trojan war, the founder of a city state; in the case of 
England, a great king or warrior: not the Pantheon and the Bible, 
but Homer and Holinshed.
In England the process of secularisation is rapid and radical. The 
first great tragedy of our stage is Dr. Faustus. This play deserves a 
little attention, as it will conveniently illustrate the contrast between 
tragedy and its precursors.
Faustus is a genius who knows everything except what is forbidden. 
He rejects the commands of God, not because he does not believe in 
their validity, but because he finds them irksome. He wants to be 
a god himself:
“ A sound magician is a demigod:
Here Faustus, tire thy brains to get a deity.”
Impelled by this magnificent ambition, he sells his soul to the Devil 
in return for enormous powers. In spite of his avowed idealistic
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intentions however, he does not use these powers to build Utopia. He 
plays practical jokes on the Pope instead, and does conjuring tricks 
before the Emperor.
He is frequently assailed by his conscience “ to abjure this magic 
and return to God.”
,,G ood A ngel: Sweet Faustus, leave that execrable art.
F a u stu s: Contrition, prayer, repentance! What of them?
Good A ngel : O they are means to draw thee up to Heaven!
Evil A ngel: Rather illusions, fruits of lunacy,
That makes men foolish that do trust them most.”
That is the matter in a nutshell. The real obstacle to faith, and 
hence to rebirth, is not intellectual, but moral. Faustus’ unwillingness 
to accept “ Contrition, prayer, repentance” springs from the tragic sin 
of pride. Having made a god of himself, he finds it impossible to 
fulfil the necessary conditions of rebirth, which seem “ the fruits of 
lunacy”  to his arrogant intellect. Under these circumstances only one 
revelation is possible: that of evil: hell. The play ends with the 
sparagmos of Faustus: he is torn out of this life by a bevy of devils.
The prototype of Humanism cannot escape the revelation of evil. 
He certainly experiences the suffering of Good Friday, but as he will 
not renounce himself, he cannot experience the resurrection of Easter 
Monday. He knows the first revelation only.
Now this is true not only of the isolated play, Faustus. Both 
Elizabethan and Greek drama, with certain notable exceptions, 
concentrate on the agon, the pathos, the sparagmos or crucifixion, 
and the death.
It would be possible, therefore, to account for the similarity of 
movement, and the presence of the evil revelation, in these two bodies 
of drama by their close proximity to ages of faith, in which the rituals 
were widely practised and the stages popularly known: but how
account for its presence in the twentieth century, in the works of 
anti-clerical writers like Sartre, and in many secular plays by Ibsen, 
Strindberg, O’Neill, Williams and Miller? I suggest that the reason 
why dramatists of all Ages give us a revelation of evil, evil as against 
what is merely wrong or socially reprehensible, is because evil exists. 
Evil is real: the abyss is there. And as tragedy, like ritual, is an
5
honest attempt to get to grips with the complexity and mystery of life 
and death, it cannot avoid so large and important a portion of reality. 
One of the reasons why the pattern found in the lives of the gods 
repeats itself in tragedies which appeal to all Ages is that it corresponds 
to something fundamental in the nature of man himself.
So much, in ridiculous brevity, for origins, developments, and 
affinities between ritual, liturgical drama, and tragedy.
I l l
Let us now define “ the self” . Before doing this, however, it is 
necessary to utter a warning.
Under the influence of Aristotle, we have tended to lay far too 
much stress on the hero. Tragedy arises from the reactions of all 
the actors to a disaster. It may certainly involve one more than others 
and for the sake of convenience we may concentrate our attention on 
the main figure, but it is essentially communal. Nor is this a ll: tragedy 
is not concerned with an isolated incident, a nasty little eddy which 
occurs, quite inexplicably, on the calm summer lake, but rather with 
a whirlpool in the treacherous stream of Time, and we are never 
allowed to forget it. Tragedy looks before and after. All the great 
tragedies I know are set against a background of public disaster or 
disturbing change. Note how many Greek plays spring from the fall 
of Troy. Oedipus begins in the disaster of a plague, Macbeth with war, 
Anthony and Cleopatra, Julius Caesar, Juno and the Pay cock, Murder 
in the Cathedral with civil strife. Many modern plays are rooted in 
the class struggle: Hedda Gabler, Lady Julie, Love on the Dole.
Tragedy then, is political and social, not private. Further, it is 
metaphysical. It involves the Gods, whether modern, bloodless 
abstracts such as Liberty, or the old living metaphors of Olympus, 
or the Holy Trinity itself. In Greek plays the human conflict is 
often a reflection of a conflict between the Gods themselves. If the 
Gods are not present Fortune, Fate and Destiny are. Shakespeare, 
like the Greeks, is full of omens, spells, curses, witches, ghosts. Even 
Ibsen makes play of the number 13 in The Wild Duck. In other words, 
tragedy is endemic to the race and the universe, and the guilt is not 
merely individual, it is the guilt of Adam. We are all members of 
one body.
It seems to me that tragedians adopt all means to heighten the 
inexplicable, the unpredictable, as if to emphasise the littleness and
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uncertainty of our knowledge, the extent to which we are moved and 
controlled by a universe which in our pride we think we can control. 
Yet they never give us a debased picture of man as a mere puppet. 
If tragedy is not possible with protagonists who have mastered the 
predicament by transcending it, it is equally impossible with beings who 
tamely submit to it. The will of man must rise, resist, revolt.
Let us now turn to the protagonist himself.
I must first attempt to define what I mean by “ the self” . I shall 
attempt a very elementary sketch, having done which, I shall outline 
what happens to this self as it passes on its way towards the revelation 
of hell.
How do we come to be individuals at all? What is an individual? 
These are questions which I shall not attempt: but I can say that 
imitation of, and reaction against other people, together with the 
employment of language, are two essential factors in the development 
of individuality.  In fact, we are shaped through relationships and 
words, the media of drama. Our concept of ourselves is given us to 
some extent at least by the people we live amongst and the words 
we learn: this concept grows and alters with our concept of the world, 
and vice versa. There must be a perpetual process of adjustment 
between the two. But this is not the only dramatic relationship to 
which we are committed from birth. We ourselves are split in two: 
an official, organising self and an unorganised welter of energies, the 
not-self.
We conduct a drama within ourselves. Of the three actors in 
this triangle, the first and the last, the exterior world and the not-self, 
are perpetually surprising and sometimes betraying the official self. 
This is potentially tragic, as most people develop a rigid and unrealistic 
official self which they would rather die than lose. In order to 
describe the relationship between these three I must use metaphors.
Let us start with the official attitude toward the exterior world. 
How does Man achieve his partial mastery over the exterior world?
First, by taking things for granted, on faith: e.g. that his parents 
will provide him with food and shelter; that what his teachers tell 
him is true; he may even accept without question the proposition that 
the universe is to be understood by reason alone.
Next, by generalising from his experience —  a process which 
involves abstraction and simplification, and hence, inevitably, an 
element of falsification. With these two instruments he maps the
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universe, with remarkable success in some fields, but comparatively 
little in others. He tends to carry the confidence learnt in one field 
into another which may need utterly different techniques. Be that 
as it may, he cannot live without maps, and his glory is that he will 
keep on trying to make them correspond ever more closely to the 
universe. But the universe, alas, is so complex and manifold, and 
life is so short, that a man may have a perfect map for splitting the 
atom and not the most rudimentary one for falling out of love.
What happens in tragedy is a failure of maps. Man finds himself 
in a primitive country which he has been led to believe his grandfathers 
tamed and civilised: or the landscape undergoes an earthquake: or the 
map is simply inaccurate, or does not go far enough, or has been 
allowed to get mildewed round the fringes. But whether our maps 
be good, bad, or merely indifferent, we are perpetually prone to 
mistake them for the country itself. We accept the metaphor for the 
thing, the generalisation for the reality. Possibly one of the reasons 
why we enjoy tragedy is that it brings us into touch with the naked 
landscape, gives us an immediate perception of a reality not filtered 
through a neat grid of concepts.
I have used the image of a map because man’s life is conveniently 
likened to a journey through life. But this metaphor will not do for 
the inner life. The self is largely an artificial creation: an organising, 
governing centre, a little Athens, or Sparta, controlling, drawing 
nourishment from an unsophisticated countryside of intuition, memory, 
appetite, instinct —  a troublesome and yet at times delightful hinterland, 
forever forming pressure groups, forwarding petitions to the centre, 
demanding satisfaction from the exterior world. The self acts as the 
parliament, stock-exchange, the market place, the post office, the link 
between exterior and interior worlds. Needless to say there is an 
extensive black market of unconscious observation, smuggled pleasures, 
of disguised visitors; many exchanges which escape the notice of the 
censor. Even the diplomacy conducted by the self is not all 
above-board: it has, for instance a favourite face-saving device known 
as rationalisation.
Peculiarly vulnerable, subject to attack from without and revolt 
from within, this little citadel, this little self, is the subject of tragedy. 
Trouble may start at either end, or from both simultaneously. Very 
often something exterior but fundamental to the self or the not-self, 
is removed by accident or design. An interior political crisis results: 
the citadel is beseiged, cut off from both the outer and the inner 
realities, from the environment it knows and which has shaped it. This
results in an anxious questioning of the maps of the exterior world and 
the laws which should govern the inner. The answers may reveal that 
both have been false; the character then is lost and does not know where 
or who he is. The foundations of the official self are shaken. Perhaps 
they crumble in hysteria, madness, violence or suicide. Once the 
organising principle in the personality loses command, the self 
disintegrates: there is a breakdown of frontiers between conscious and 
unconscious, a tearing up of maps, a frantic search for others, a 
contact with an intolerable reality. This is the sparagmos, the 
tearing asunder.
Let us now look at the first stage in this process: the deprivation 
resulting in isolation. This is usually extremely complicated and 
multiple. Let me however attempt to describe in metaphor the effects 
of a fairly simple deprivation: the loss of a husband or wife in a 
happy marriage.
Imagine two trees whose stems are a few feet apart. In spite of this 
they do not seem to hamper each other in any w ay : they operate to form 
a single, roundtopped silhouette. In winter they trace a sing'e pattern 
as symmetrical and fine as the veins in a leaf. You notice, however, 
that one comes into blossom a week before the other. This disturbs 
you slightly splitting, as it does, what you took to be a reassuring 
unity. The “ inevitable”  happens, of course. One of the trees dies. 
The living tree is locked to a dead skeleton. Here and there its green 
appears incongruously among the lifeless brown. When the dead tree 
is removed, not only are some of the living branches torn away but 
the whole volume of air which it had occupied now seems a void, 
a vacuum into which one or two living branches stretch and find 
nothing. Most distressing of all, from the side where the dead tree 
stood, you can see the living tree in section, from the inside as it 
were: not the fine exterior of leaf and twig, but the crude main 
branches, the bruised and broken members, the warp and twist of the 
main structure. Its privacy is gone. It looks isolated, exposed 
and vulnerable.
This corresponds to the agon and the pathos: it is pathetic, not 
yet tragic. The tree may recover fairly quickly, sending out new 
growth to cover its naked side. To be tragic the main structure must 
be attacked and hurt, rent by a storm, struck by lighting, uprooted, 
cut to pieces. In other words, deprivation and isolation are 
preliminaries only.
This brings us to the sparagmos, the rending asunder of the self.
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The metaphors I employ this time are from the tragedies themselves. 
In tragedy after tragedy, usually during the climax, when the process 
of deprivation and isolation is far advanced, two simple cries are heard: 
first: ‘ ‘Where am I” ? or " I  am lost” ; and ‘ ‘I am undone” .
The metaphor in the first is geographical. The world has changed 
so radically that the speaker does not recognise his surroundings: the 
signposts are pointing to places he does not know, or of which he is 
terrified.
The second metaphor is taken from binding. The rope which has 
bound diverse elements into a unity has been cut, and the strong 
fasces is a disordered jumble of sticks.
The first may be taken as the type of the many metaphors which 
tragic writers use to convey the experience of basic exile and alienation 
from the world; the second as the type which conveys the experience 
of inner chaos, loss of self. Both find their fullest expression in two 
common characteristics of tragic figures: exile and madness. Both are 
intimately related to each other, since one is the outward, the other 
the inward glance of the tragic eye. In fact, once a character starts 
doubting who he is, once the chorus starts asking “ What is Man?” , 
once the events on the stage raise this basic uncertainty in the minds 
of the audience we are, potentially, in the world of great tragedy: the 
world not merely of physical deprivation and nervous fear, but of 
spiritual panic, anxiety, suspense. This raises the pity and terror 
proper to tragedy —  a tearing asunder, a falling apart in a protracted 
crisis, which threatens to conquer, and sometimes does conquer, the self.
In order to establish this point, crucial to my thesis, let us glance 
at two plays, the one written during an age of faith, the other as an 
age of faith is waning.
The first is the Medieval allegory, Everyman.
God sends His “ mighty messenger” , Death, to Everyman, 
summoning him to present an account of his life. Now Death is 
precisely one of those portions of reality which we find uncomfortable 
and therefore tend to forget. We leave that range or river off our maps, 
although we may have to cross it at any time. Everyman staggers at 
the news, and immediately the process of disillusion and alienation 
starts. He asks his best friends to come with him, friends who have 
(to mix the metaphors) been major reference points and signposts on 
his m ap : Fellowship (Society, the kindly comity of men, the club, the 
common-room); Kinsmen (his family, wife, parents, daughter, son 
and heir), Goods (his property, house, farm, business, professional 
practice). They all prove men of straw. This, not unnaturally, makes
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Everyman feel like a man of straw himself. His eyes are opened, and 
he looks towards himself :
"Thus may I well myselfe hate.”
Isolated, his fear deepens to panic. He knows he is lost, the map has 
failed. The panic, however, does not spread to his deepest self, for 
his Good Deeds, the nearest he has ever got to reality, comes to the 
rescue, bringing Knowledge with her, who shows him how illusory 
his view of himself and the world has been. He sheds illusion in 
humility and penitence, and restored to hope by faith in Christ, dies 
to his old self, and goes towards his grave. Although the moment of 
panic is past, his agony is not over. As he approaches the grave he 
has to say good-bye to his Five Wits, his Beauty, his Strength, his 
Discretion, in fact all the things which helped to build the official 
self, the partial image which cannot survive the grave. Good Deeds 
alone enters the grave with him. Although sore afflicted, his last words 
are confident. He trusts in his God who has won the victory over 
sin and death for him.
"Into Thy hands, Lorde, my soule I commende.
Few people would call Everyman a tragedy. Is it because the 
ending is in essence a happy one? I do not think so. A terrible ending 
is not essential to Tragedy. Think of the God-given solution with which 
the Oresteia ends, of the apotheosis of Oedipus at Colonus, of the 
ecstatic reconciliation of Anthony and Cleopatra in death, of the sublime 
hush at the close of Samson Agonistes.
Let us look at the first mentioned of these: the Oresteia, Aeschylus’ 
trilogy. The three plays which compose this work are concerned with a 
conflict of duties so profound that it involves the gods themselves: the 
duty to avenge a murdered father and the law against matricide.
In the first play, the Agememnon, Clytemnestra kills her husband 
as he returns from the ten year war at Troy. In a sense, he gets what 
he richly deserves. Not only had he offered their daughter as a sacrifice 
to ensure a favourable wind to sail for Troy, but he has brought home 
as his unwilling mistress, Cassandra (who, incidentally, introduces the 
element of madness). Yet the gods had called for the sacrifice. 
Moreover he is a member of a house with a curse upon it. The chorus 
wonders if the curse will ever be lifted. With his murder a primitive 
sort of justice is satisfied: the justice of the family or clan, which 
demanded vengeance for the murder of a member.
In the next play, his exiled son, Orestes, returns. He is not yet a 
tragic figure, although he has been deprived of his father, his throne,
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his homeland. Apollo, who here appears as the god of tribal law, 
expressly lays upon him the duty of avenging his father, although it 
involves matricide. Orestes kills his mother. So far he has followed 
what might be called a traditional map of behaviour. So far the arena 
has been mainly exterior, the city of Argos. It now becomes the soul 
of Orestes. He is immediately set upon by the furies, symbols of an 
intolerable, dementing guilt. Yet Apollo, who layed the task upon 
him, must surely share this guilt.
The next play, The Eumenides, opens with Orestes prostrate before 
the statue of Apollo, surrounded by the furies and haunted by the 
ghost of his mother. Apollo promises help, but cannot give it himself. 
How can he? The same law which demanded the death of Agememnon 
should demand the death of Orestes. He sends the guilt-laden man to 
the shrine of Athene, the goddess of counsel and wisdom, where we 
next see him. He has travelled far and wide, serving a time of exile 
and penance. Athene undertakes to arbitrate between Orestes and the 
furies. The mechanism of reconciliation is too complicated to trace here, 
but, in short, he is relieved, and restored to his senses and his kingdom 
by the goddess, who, working through a wise council of men, modifies 
the crude old law of an eye for an eye. Orestes is freed from the furies; 
and the curse is lifted.
I have given this extremely crude outline of the Oresteia because 
it presents what might be called the complete tragic pattern: the 
questioning of the old answer or map, the deadlock or the state of 
crisis, followed by the new answer or map: in fact, the double
revelation of the ritual. The difference between Everyman and Orestes 
is that Everyman never for a moment doubts or questions God, nor 
himself: his soul is not torn asunder, while that of Orestes is. Orestes 
gets his answer only after protracted agony of exile and madness. Yet 
his suffering has achieved not only a more reliable map, but has done 
something for all men. Tribal law has given place to wisdom, Apollo to 
Athene. The problem, be it noted, has not been answered, but trans­
cended, and the social context is no longer the clan, but the state.
What conclusion can we draw from this comparison?
Both heroes are confronted with an evil with which they cannot 
cope, and both discover an answer. One play is considered a tragedy, 
the other not. It seems to me that the determining difference lies in the 
presence in one of what I have defined as a protracted “ spiritual crisis 
involving a tearing asunder of the self” .
IV
My next task is to establish the presence of “ a revelation of evil as 
a reality” . This I shall do by reading passages taken from the crises of
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plays, ancient, Elizabethan and modern. You will forgive me if I 
preface these passages with a short note on the poetic means employed 
to communicate this revelation.
I have already pointed out two common metaphors which occur 
during the crisis: and suggested their derivation from two fundamental 
fears: homelessness, exile, not belonging; and loss of self, shame, 
disgrace, madness. These fears are communicated in several ways: 
by symbolical movement and gesture, by external deprivation which we 
know will have an internal effect: but none of these is as important as 
the use of metaphor in the spoken word
Certain metaphors recur so often in Tragedy as to be called stock 
(as stock as the use of light to indicate life, and darkness, death) —  
permanent metaphors, in fact. Most common and powerful, I think, 
are those drawn from storms: storms which envelope both sea and 
land in a destructive fury —  wind, water, thunder, lightning; images 
of shipwreck, washaway, inundation, drowning. Next, images of fire, 
burning, scorching, thirst, drought. Fire and flood are the oldest 
enemies of m an: the primordial foes of his element, land, the destroyers 
of his house or c ity : obvious images of destruction and chaos. Then 
there are metaphors taken from the animal world, springing either from 
our fear of the tooth and the claw, or, more likely, the terror of our 
consciousness for the unconscious dog beneath the skin: the terror of 
reverting to bestiality; and images springing from a terror of disease and 
maiming, of an intimate decay, of the disintegration and putrefaction of 
the grave. There are others, but those examples will suffice. King Lear 
draws from all the above sources.
Before I give extended examples of this peculiar revelation which 
accompanies the sparagmos or rending asunder of the personality, here 
are one or two ordinary usages which show that this is no esoteric 
experience: “ During the disaster he let himseslf go to pieces”  or “ He 
told the hysterical girl to pull herself together” .
The following single lines from Shakespeare contain a clear element 
of sparagmos.
Hamlet sighs as if “ to shatter all his bulk and end his being” .
Othello cries: “ If she loves me not, chaos is come again.’ ’
Richard the Second, at his abdication, smashes the mirror in which 
he sees the “ brittle glory’ ’ of his face.
Let us now look at a few longer passages which contain the element 
I am speaking of.
OEDIPUS R E X
Oedipus, deranged at the revelation of his birth, has blinded 
himself, thus exiling himself from a world which is no longer tolerable.
13
Oed :
O agony!
Where am I ? Is this my voice 
That is bourne on the air?
What fate has come to me?
Chorus :
Unspeakable to mortal ear,
Too terrible for eyes to see.
Oed :
O dark intolerable, inescapable night 
That has no day!
Cloud that no air can take a w a y . . . .
Apollo, friends, Apollo
Has laid this agony on me . . . .
What should I do with eyes 
Where all is ugliness?
C horus:
It cannot be denied.
Oed :
Where is there any beauty 
For me to see? Where loveliness 
Of sight or sound ? Away !
Lead me quickly away 
Out of this land. I am lost,
Hated of gods, no man so damned.
KING LEAR
King Lear, hurt to the soul by the heartlessness and malice of his 
daughters, is an exile in his own kingdom, an old man staggering about 
in a storm, with only fools and madman for company. He is going 
mad himself.
Lear:
Blow, winds, and crack your cheeks! R age! B low !
You cataracts and hurricanes, spout
Till you have drenched our steeples, drown’d the cocks!
You sulphurous and thought-executing fires,
Vaunt couriers to oak-cleaving thunderbolts,
Singe my white head! And thou, all shaking thunder,
Strike flat the thick rotundity o’ the world,
Crack nature’s moulds, all germins spill at once 
That make ingrateful m an!
Fool:
O nuncle, court holywater in a dry house is better than this 
rain water out o’ doors. Good nuncle, in, and ask thy daughter’s 
blessing: here’s a night pities neither wise men nor a fool.
L eak :
Rumble thy bellyfull! Spit, fire, spout, hail!
Nor ram, wind, thunder, fire, are my daughters.
I tax you not you elements, with unkindness:
I never gave you kingdom, call’d you children,
You owe me no subscription: then, let fall 
Your horrible pleasure: here I stand, your slave,
A poor, infirm, weak and despised old man.
But yet I call you servile ministers 
That have with two pernicious daughters joined 
Your high-engendered battles ’gainst a head 
As old and white as this. O ! O ! ’tis foul.
THE DUCHESS OF MALFI
In an attempt to break her spirit, her brothers have exiled her 
from all that matters to her. Imprisoned in her own castle, she has just 
been led to believe that her husband and eldest son have been 
murdered. Her brothers have filled her house with madmen, in the 
hope of driving her to despair. When these withdraw, Bosola comes to 
kill her. Bosola is an exile of the Elizabethan type: the melancholy 
man. This scene is interesting because the spirit of the main protagonist 
is not broken: she keeps her faith in herself: so much so that it is 
Bosola who starts to question himself. Having murdered her, he 
becomes her avenger. Of her brothers, one goes mad, the other dies 
with a splendid, if diabolical stoicism.
B osola:
I am come to make thy tomb.
Duchess:
Ha ! My tomb !
Thou speakest as if I lay on my deathbed,
Gasping for breath: dost thou perceive me sick ?
B osola:
Yes, and the more dangerously, since thy sickness is insensible.
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D uchess:
Thou art not mad, sure: dost know me?
Bosola:
Yes.
Duch ess:
Who am I?
Bosola:
Thou art a box of worm-seed, at best but a salvatory of green 
mummy. What’s this flesh? A little crudded milk, fantastical 
puff paste. Our bodies are weaker than those paper prisons boys 
use to keep flies in : more contemptible, since ours is to preserve 
earth worms. Didst ever see a lark in a cage? Such is the soul 
in the body: the world is like her little turf of grass, and the 
heaven o’er our heads, like her looking glass, only gives us a 
miserable knowledge of the small compass of our prison.
D uchess :
Am I not thy duchess?
B osola:
Thou art some great woman, sure 
Duch ess:
I am the duchess of Malfi still.
A little later, just before the executioners enter, Bosola comments 
as follows on life:
“ Of what is’t fools make such vain keeping?
Sin their conception, their birth weeping,
Their life a general mist of error,
Their death a hideous storm of terror.’ ’
JUNO AND THE PA YCO CK
The following verses are spoken by Mary, whose lover has lef t  
her, and who has just been deserted for the second time:
An’ we felt the power that fashioned 
All the lovely things we saw,
That created all the murmur 
Of an everlasting law.
Was a hand of force and beauty 
With an eagle’s tearing claw.
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Then we saw the globe of beauty 
Was an ugly thing as well,
A hymn divine whose chorus 
Was an agonising y e ll:
Like the story of a demon 
That an angel had to tell:
MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL
The following extracts are from the chorus which is spoken while 
Beckett is being murdered by the drunken knights. You will notice 
the language of panic, the sense of exile and loss in a world that is 
"Wholly foul”  :
"Clear the air! Clean the sky! Wash the wind! Take stone 
from stone and wash them.
The land is foul, the water is foul, our beasts and ourselves defiled 
with blood.
A rain of blood has blinded my eyes. Where is England? Where 
is Kent? Where is Canterbury?
O  far, far, far in the past; and I wander in a land of broken
boughs: if I break them, they bleed: I wander in a land of 
dry stones: if I touch them they bleed.
How can I ever return, to the soft quiet seasons? . . . .
But this, this is out of life, this is out of time,
An instant eternity of evil and wrong.
We are soiled by a filth we cannot clean, united to super-natural 
vermin,
It is not we alone, it is not the house, it is not the city that is defiled, 
But the world that is wholly foul.
Clear the air! Clean the sky, wash the wind! Take the stone 
from the stone, take the skin from the arm, take the muscle 
from the bone, and wash them. Wash the stone, wash the bone, 
wash the brain, wash the soul, wash them, wash them.”
I  hope that these passages, short as they are, have shown what I 
mean by a revelation of evil in tragedy.
In these examples it is superbly articulate, but in many plays the 
statement is not so direct. It may be achieved by loading two characters 
or concepts with every possible incompatibility and then violating the 
one by the other: by pouring the sweet milk of concord into hell. A 
modern example of this is the rape of Blanche du Bois by Kowalsky in 
A Streetcar Named Desire. The revelation of the details of her lover’s 
suicide to Hedda Gabler is another. One of the major problems of a 
realistic technique, however, is to make the revelation articulate. Much
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can be done to suggest it by the use of dancing and music: there is 
the superb scene during the seduction of lady Julie. Much can be done 
by a set of interrelated symbols: the sea, swamp and forest symbols 
in The Wild Duck. But without the catalysing clarity of poetry, I do 
not think we shall ever be able to do anything but whisper shamefacedly 
in the presence of Aesychulus and Shakespeare.
But whatever the technique employed, I am satisfied that the 
communication of terror by this means is something which all tragedies 
worthy of the name must have.
V
It only remains to say a little about possible dramatic answers to this 
revelation of evil. This section is the most tentative of all.
The problem is complicated by the fact that a single play may 
contain several responses to the disaster, some hopeful, some hopeless. 
In some plays we will be misled if we attend only to the destinies of the 
protagonists. What matters is the world in which they act: the author’s 
judgment of them, his intentions. For instance, although the Duchess 
of Malfi dies nobly, firm in her faith: although her death ennobles 
her murderer and turns him into her avenger, although her brothers 
are punished, and her son is to come into her estates, the total effect 
of the play is pessimistic if not nihilistic. We may even have, as in 
King Lear, the complete tragic pattern of death-to-self and regeneration, 
but it is all to no purpose as the universe in which this takes place 
knows nothing of such a process. The ending is disastrous, and the 
spirit stoical: “ Men must endure their going hence even as their
coming hither.’ ’
Unless the ending of the play in some way justifies the agon, the 
pathos and the death, the pattern is incomplete. In the complete 
pattern the pain need not be explained —  indeed, who can explain 
pain? — but we must be satisfied that as a result of a victory over it, 
the universe makes better sense. Not only must the inner chaos be 
mastered, but the outer world must appear to be capable of mastery. 
Man may still seem an exile on earth, but he must be assured of a home 
in the Universe. There must be a possibility of heaven after hell and 
purgatory. There must be a revelation of good as well as evil.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me make it quite clear that the absence 
of a resolution such as we saw in the Eumenides has nothing to do with 
the greatness or otherwise of a p lay: a resolution is simply one of the 
ways in which a tragedy may end.
I think, however, that it might be possible to classify endings 
under three heads: Nihilistic, Stoical, Religious or Transcendental.
B y a Nihilistic ending I mean one which leaves an impression of 
suffering to no purpose in an alien or apathetic universe. Plays which
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leave this impression on me are The Trojan Women, Racine’s 
Andromache, Hedda Gabler, Cocteau’s The Infernal Machine and 
Miller’s Death of a Salesman.
I would use the word Stoical to describe plays in which the 
impression is very much the same, but partly redeemed by the fortitude 
and dignity of humanity in the face of a capricious and inexplicable 
universe: the flies in the hands of the wanton gods bear themselves 
nobly. Here I would place King Lear, The Revenger’ s Tragedy, Sartre’s 
The Flies.
I would apply the terms Religious or Transcendental to plays in 
which an answer is found in something bigger than intellect or law, 
something which springs from the principle of sacrifice itself, the 
principle which lies’at the heart of the germinal rite: a dying into life. 
It might be described as the discovery of an ultimate solvent, love or 
agape, of a map which includes so much of reality that the Furies 
themselves have become the Eumenides, and the sin of Adam the blessed 
fault. Plays, apart from those already mentioned, which I would include 
in this group, are Milton’s Samson Agonistes, Shelly’s Prometheus, 
Goethe’s Faust, Murder in the Cathedral and The Family Reunion.
The Family Reunion is particularly interesting, as Harry, the hero 
is a modern Orestes, who has to break out of his haunted, unreal world 
by way of expiation and forgiveness. Eliot, in attempting to do this, 
has had to say in one play what Aeschylus said in three. And here we 
are up against the technical problem of the limits imposed by acting- 
time and the capacity of the audience. It is difficult enough to achieve 
tragic effects in two hours without saddling oneself with the provision 
of a resolution as well. The single play does not allow time enough, 
perhaps, to concentrate on both the death and the rebirth; perhaps one 
has to choose where one will lay the emphasis.
It is not surprising that Mr. Eliot’s next play, The Cocktail Party, 
neglects the way into the dilemma, and concentrates almost entirely 
on the way out of it. It is interesting to note, too, the answers he gives. 
two are to be stoics, to make the best of a bad jo b : one has not yet 
got as far as asking the tragic question and therefore gets no answer; 
another is reborn.
I mention this play, a tragi-comedy —  because it may be a portent. 
The modern theatre has so far been non-committal in the face of the 
tragic question. It has concentrated on the pathos and the agon. Now 
there is a certain delight in tragedy when one’s own world and 
consciousness are relatively secure: but there comes a point at which 
further contemplation of the abyss is intolerable. Perhaps we are
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reaching that point: perhaps the long-neglected portion of the tragic 
pattern is to come into its own.
Is this wishful thinking? Possibly. But I would like to close 
with a piece of evidence in favour of my suggestion which concerns the 
dramatist who looked deeper into the abyss than any other: Shakespeare.
After centuries of misunderstanding, of being called fanciful and 
even preposterous, of being patronised as the work of a failing genius, 
the last plays of Shakespeare are being taken seriously: Cymbeline, The 
Winter’ s Tale, The Tempest. It is as if Shakespeare lived through the 
pattern himself, and wrote these last plays when he had transcended 
the problem of evil. Whether this is so or not, these last plays all 
concentrate on the way out of the dilemma, and the way out in all is 
basically the same.
There are parallels, not to be pressed too far, between Lear and 
Cymbeline; both old autocrats who lose, and find, their favourite
children. Lear ends in a revelation which is as futile as it is sublime, 
the victim of wanton gods, with gloom and ruin on the realm.
Cymbeline ends with reconciliation: “ pardon’s the word for all” .
Incense and psalms ascend to the gods, and peace links the kingdoms 
of Britain and Rome.
In Othello, Shakespeare had depicted the diabolical power of
jealousy. In The Winter’ s Tale he returns to the “ green-eyed monster” , 
and tames it by humility and penitence. The climax of the play, you will 
remember, is a symbolical bringing to life.
In both these plays, and in The Tempest, the whole world seems 
to be reborn: it is the world of spring: and the bearers of grace and 
forgiveness, Imogen, Perdita and Miranda, are like no one so much as 
the Madonna of the Medieval Lyrics.
Lastly, The Tempest: the wronged Prospero, the exile, turns all 
his Faust-like powers to heal and not to revenge; the stupendous 
intellect is gentle, humble before a reality which is not ultimately but 
immediately mysterious. His last words, and possibly the last verses 
Shakespeare penned, are these: they are an acceptance of the conditions 
of rebirth which Faustus had rejected.
Now I want
Spirits to enforce, art to enchant,
And my ending is despair 
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces so that it assaults 
Mercy itself and frees all faults.
As you from crimes would pardoned be 
Let your indulgence set me free.
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